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THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INDEPENDENT TANKER OWNERS
(INTERTANKO) v. LOCKE:
DO OIL AND STATE TANKER REGULATION MIX?
Peter J. Carney*
I. INTRODUCTION
In The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) v. Locke,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a number
of Washington State's Best Achievable Protection (BAP)2 Regulations
governing oil tankers operating in Washington State waters. The court
upheld the State's regulations against a tanker operator's organization
challenge that federal law, Coast Guardregulations, and international treaties
preempted the state regulations.3 The precedent-setting decision establishes
that the federal regulation of oil tankers, and tanker regulations set forth in
international treaties, in most instances, merely establish minimum standards
that states may surpass in the interest of protecting their marine and shoreline
resources. The holding of the Ninth Circuit is critical to the nature of future
state environmental legislation as it provides insight into the power that
states may find in savings clauses of federal statutes when fashioning
environmental regulations.
This Note briefly surveys past and present tanker regulation, and
analyzes the court's rationale in upholding the Washington tanker regula-
tions. The influence of the savings clause in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
will be established, and the power derived from it identified for future use
by state governments. The court's characterization of the issue before it will
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2000.
1. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke,
148 F.3d 1053 (9"' Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 33 (1999).
2. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.46.010(2) (West 1996). "Best Achievable Protec-
tion" implies utilization of the state of the art in the industry. Washington's statute defines
"Best Available Protection" as: "the highest level ofprotection that can be achieved through
the use of the best achievable technology... training procedures, and operational methods
which provide the greatest degree of protection available."
3. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1060.
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be examined, and its significance in upholding Washington's regulations
will be demonstrated. Finally, this Note considers the effect of the court's
decision establishing that international environmental regulations merely set
minimum standards that may be surpassed by state legislation.
II. EXISTING OIL TANKER REGULATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL AND FEDERAL LAW
Oil tanker regulations arise at various levels of political association
because of varying needs ranging from industry-wide uniformity to
protection of local resources. Both federal and international tanker
regulations seek uniformity in an industry where the crossing of international
borders is a regular occurrence, there exists a complexity of interactions
between national jurisdictions, and communication difficulties arise because
several different languages are often spoken among the members of a ship's
crew.4 Vessel registration practices compound these problems because
tanker vessels may be flagged in one of many countries, despite the
geographic location in which they predominantly operate, leaving regulation
and enforcement to jurisdictions uneven in ability and motive.' In light of
these difficulties, a lack of uniformity in operational procedures from varied
jurisdictional regulations may have disastrous consequences.
A. Uniformity is Sought by Tanker Regulation in International Law to
Further Maritime Safety and International Trade
Tanker regulation is governed by several international treaties 6 that seek
to provide uniform tanker regulations critical to the safety and efficiency of
tankers operating in the waters of multiple jurisdictions, 7 and that are
4. See Stephen R. Swanson, Federalism, The Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 379, 409 (1996).
5. See id.
6. See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47;
the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546; the Multilateral International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459; the Agreement for a Cooperative
Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, Dec. 19, 1979, 32 U.S.T.
377; and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261.
7. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 493 (9'h Cir. 1984); see also
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,448 (1979) ("Foreign Commerce
is preeminently a matter of national concern. In international relations and with respect to
foreign intercourse and trade, the people of the United States [must] act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power.").
Intertanko v. Locke
logically related to the types of environmental harm caused by oil spills.
One can imagine many situations where safety would be seriously compro-
mised due to irregular operational procedures because of the inability to
quickly react by reason of limited or ineffective communication. From the
perspective of efficiency in international trade, a lack of uniformity in
maritime regulation can create confusion resulting in inefficiency within the
industry.8 Uniform international tanker regulation is encouraged for
environmental reasons because such a scheme is logical in light of the nature
of oil spills which often cause damage across international borders.9
Proponents of strict uniformity at the international level further argue that a
lack of uniform international regulations may encourage tanker operators to
actively seek destinations with less stringent regulations and liabilities,
ultimately resulting in less protection for the environment.'0 It is also
theorized that vessels may opt for longer or more treacherous routes in
avoiding jurisdictions with more stringent safety regulations, resulting in an
increased potential for accidents."
B. The Evolution of Federal Oil Tanker Regulation Culminating
in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In Congress's most recent venture into tle field of tanker regulation, the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA 90"),2 Congress sought to prevent the
reoccurrence of natural disasters associated with oil spills such as the Exxon
Valdez in Prince William Sound. Because the tanker industry is often able
to externalize the environmental costs associated with oil spills, and is
therefore not sufficiently encouraged to prevent spills, Congress deemed the
Act necessary to compensate for the failure of the tanker industry to
undertake spill prevention measures on its own. In light of the irreversible
ecological damage resulting from oil spills, Congress enacted OPA 90
primarily as a preventative measure to avert spills before they happen, as
opposed to establishing an "end-of-pipe" scheme designed to facilitate the
8. See Swanson, supra note 4, at 380-81.
9. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 166 (1977) (quoting the Senate report
to the Tank Vessel Act stating that "[t]he Senate report recognizes ... that international
solutions in this area are preferable since the problem of marine pollution is worldwide.").
10. See Swanson, supra note 4, at 410.
11. See id.
12. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (West Supp. 1999).
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expedient cleanup of unintended oil discharges.' 3 However, the Act also
addresses oil pollution removal, liability, and compensation.
Although past congressional acts have often addressed the field of oil
tanker regulation in a piecemeal fashion, the aggregate result is a fairly
comprehensive body of legislation. The Tank Vessel Act of 193614 was
Congress's first foray into the field of tanker regulation and "sought to effect
a 'reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations regarding ship
construction.""' 15 The Tank Vessel Act was subsequently modified by the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) 16 in 1972. The PWSA specifically
addressed the "design and operating characteristics of oil tankers."'' 7 In
1978, both the Tank Vessel Act and the PWSA were modified by the Port
and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA).'8 The PTSA required the Secretary of
Transportation to regulate vessel management, working environment, and
pilotage, and to establish language requirements.' 9
C. Existing Case Law on Oil Tanker Pollution Clearly Demarcates
Where States Are Welcome to Regulate and
Where Federal Preemption Begins
Case law generally holds that states have the authority to regulate where
pollution or environmental protection is the primary goal, but that this
authority does not extend to regulating ship design or construction.2" Before
13. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 722, 724:
[A]ny oil spill, no matter how quickly we respond to it or how well we contain it, is
going to harm the environment. Consequently, preventing oil spills is more important
than containing and cleaning them up quickly .... At the present time, the costs of
spilling and paying for its clean-up and damage is not high enough to encourage greater
industry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective techniques to contain them.
14. See Tank Vessel Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-765, 49 Stat. 1889 (1936).
15. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,166 (1978) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 74-
2962, at 2 (1926)) (emphasis added).
16. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424
(1972).
17. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
18. See Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
19. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 9101, 9102 (West Supp. 1999).
20. See Charles L. Coleman III, Federal Preemption of State "BAP" Laws: Repelling
State Boarders in the Interest of Uniformity, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 305, 327 (1997):
A brief review of the leading maritime oil pollution cases confirms the existence of a
clear dividing line between those areas in which a state or local entity remains free to
regulate, and those areas where such regulations are preempted. [T]his line corres-
ponds, for most purposes, to the gunwale of the vessel. The state has a free hand once
the oil hits its waters, but it is not permitted to bring its regulations on board the vessel
... for the purposes of regulating the equipment, crew training, manning, or other
Intertanko v. Locke
Intertanko, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.2' was the most significant case on
state-issued BAP regulations. As in Intertanko, Ray involved oil tanker
regulations promulgated by the State of Washington.22 The Ray Court held
that the State's regulations calling for requirements such as minimum shaft
horsepower, twin screws, double hull construction, two radars, and certain
navigational equipment were invalid.3 The Court further held that the
State's regulations governed design and construction characteristics,
impermissibly interfering in a realm of regulation implicitly preempted by
the Port and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) that prescribed these duties
exclusively to the Secretary of Transportation.24
The Court in Ray, however, limited its holding solely to design
characteristics z leading the Court to uphold one of the State's regulations.
The validated regulation required oil tankers of at least 50,000 deadweight
tons to carry a Washington licensed pilot while navigating Puget Sound.
The pilot regulation was upheld because the Court found that the regulation
was not a "design requirement," and therefore was not preempted under the
PWSA. The Court held that although the Secretary of Transportation was
empowered with the authority to establish an escort regulation, he had not
done so; thus, there was no conflict with any federal regulation and the State
was free to act on its own.26 The Court instead found the pilot requirement
to be an operating rule "arising from the peculiarities of local waters that
call[ed] for special precautionary measures."2 This is a significant statement
because it establishes a precedent distinguishing the need for uniformity
mandating federal preemption from the need to regulate for special
conditions of local waters permitting state action.
Another significant case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond,8 challenged
a State of Alaska regulation prohibiting oil tankers from discharging into
operational issues.
21. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1977).
22. See id. at 154.
23. See id. at 161.
24. See id. at 164.
25. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,487 (91, Cir. 1984) (quoting
the court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 168-169) ("As a matter of fact, the
court specifically explained that tankers must meet 'otherwise valid state or federal rules or
regulations that do not constitute design or construction specifications."').
26. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 180.
27. Id. at 171.
28. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9h' Cir. 1984).
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state waters ballast water stored in a vessel's oil tanks.2 9 The court upheld
Alaska's regulation on the grounds that it did not conflict with Coast Guard
regulations,3" and that the purpose of the state regulation was grounded in the
regulation of water pollution, a legitimate exercise of state police power."
The Chevron court applied the analysis used by the Ray Court in determin-
ing whether Congress intended to implicitly occupy the field of regulating
oil tankers in state waters. 2 The court found that, in the absence of express
preemption language and conflicting federal regulation, Congress did not
intend to solely occupy the field of tanker regulation, and that concurrent
state legislation in the field was permissible. The Chevron court, agreeing
with the Court in Ray, acknowledged that the state legislation would fail
should it directly conflict with federal legislation.33
III. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER
OWNERS (INTERTANKO) V. LOCKE
A. Facts
In legislative response to the Exxon Valdez spill, The State of Washing-
ton implemented several regulatory measures to protect its marine
resources.34 These regulations supplement federal regulations established by
OPA 90 affecting the operational procedures of oil tankers, and impose other
requirements on oil tankers that operate in Washington's state waters.
29. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) (Michie 1976) (amended 1998). The statute states:
Cargo in tank vessels ... engaged in the marine transportation of crude oil, refined
petroleum products or their by-products may not be placed in segregated ballast tanks,
nor may ballast be placed in cargo tanks of those tank vessels having segregated
ballast systems. However, the department may by regulation permit the placing of
ballast in the cargo tanks of those vessels in emergency situations. All ballast placed
in cargo tanks shall be processed by or in an onshore ballast water treatment facility
and may not be discharged in to the waters of the state.
30. See 33 C.F.R. § 157.29, 157.37(a)(1) (1998) (Coast guard regulations prohibit
deballasting from oil cargo tanks within fifty miles of shore.).
31. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 488.
32. See id. at 486:
In determining congressional intent, relevant subjects include the Supreme Court's
decision Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 98 S. Ct. 988, 55 L. Ed. 2d
(1978); comprehensiveness of federal regulations; consideration of state police power;
congressional intent that there be collaborative federal/state efforts to protect the
marine environment; need for uniform regulation; history of regulation on the subject
matter; and available legislative history.
33. See id.
34. See WASH. REv. CoDEANN. § 88.46.010 (West 1996); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-
21-010 (1997).
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Specifically, the Washington regulations challenged in this instance require
that tanker operators file oil spill prevention plans with the State, and comply
with the State's Best Achievable Protection Regulations.35
35. Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (W.D. Wash. 1996). The district
court summarized the challenged regulations as follows:
Event Reporting - WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report all events such
as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents for the five years preceding filing of a
prevention plan, and all events that occur thereafter for tankers that operate in Puget
Sound.
Operating Procedures - Watch Practices - WAC 317-21-200. Requires tankers
to employ specific watch and lookout practices while navigating and when at anchor,
and requires a bridge resource management system that is the "standard practice
throughout the owner's or operator's fleet," and which organizes responsibilities and
coordinates communication between members of the bridge.
Operating Procedures - Navigation - WAC 317-21-205. Requires tankers in
navigation in state to record position every fifteen minutes, to write a comprehensive
voyage plan before entering state waters, and to make frequent compass checks while
under way.
Operating Procedures-Engineering-WAC 317-21-210. Requires tankers in state
waters to follow specified engineering and monitoring practices.
Operating Procedures - Prearrival Tests and Inspections - WAC 317-21-215.
Requires tankers to undergo a number of tests and inspections of engineering,
navigation and propulsion systems twelve hours or less before entering or getting
underway in state waters.
Operating Procedures - Emergency Procedures - WAC 317-21-220. Requires
tanker master to post written crew assignments and procedures for a number of
shipboard emergencies.
Operating Procedure- Events - WAC 317-21-225. Requires that when an event
transpires in state waters, such as a collision, allision or near-miss incident, the operator
is prohibited from erasing, discarding or altering the position plotting records and the
comprehensive written voyage plan.
Personnel Policies - Training - WAC 317-21-230. Requires operators to provide
a comprehensive training program for personnel that goes beyond the necessary to
obtain a license or merchant marine document, and which includes instructions on a
number of specific procedures.
Personnel Policies - Illicit Drug and Alcohol Use - WAC 317-21-235. Requires
drug and alcohol testing and reporting.
Personnel Policies-PersonnelEvaluation-WAC 317-21-240. Requires operators
to monitor the fitness for duty of crew members, and requires operators to at least
annually provide a job performance and safety evaluation for all crew members on
vessels covered by a prevention plan who serve for more than six months in a year.
Personnel Policies - Work Hours - WAC 317-21-245. Sets limitations on the
number of hours crew members may work.
Personnel Policies - Language - WAC 317-21-250. Requires all licensed deck
officers and the vessel master to be proficient in English and to speak a language
understood by subordinate officers and unlicensed crew. Also requires all written
instruction to be printed in a language understood by the licensed officers and
unlicensed crew.
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Because the court's decision relied partly on the necessity for state
regulation due to the peculiarities of local waters, it is important to note
some of the geographical and ecological features, and use characteristics of
the Washington Coast and Puget Sound. The district court cited several
characteristics of Puget Sound as being important facts in upholding the
State's regulations: the rich biological diversity found in the waters; the
Sound's susceptibility to damage from oil pollution because it is relatively
confined and shallow;36 and challenges to navigation due to vessel traffic,
fog, and natural obstructions.
37
Plaintiff, Intertanko, is a trade association representing members that
own or operate oil tankers.38 Intertanko members call at oil facilities in
Puget Sound.39 Intertanko initially filed suit in federal district court
challenging several of the State's regulations on a federal preemption theory
grounded in the Supremacy Clause and in the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, and various international treaties.4" Intertanko
also claimed that Washington's regulations infringed upon the foreign affairs
power of the federal government.4 The district court granted the State's
motion for summary judgment and upheld every one of the challenged
regulations.42 Subsequently, Intertanko appealed to the Ninth Circuit, whose
opinion is the subject matter of this Casenote.43
Personnel Policies - Record Keeping - WAC 317-21-255. Requires operators to
maintain training records for crew members assigned to vessels covered by a
prevention plan.
Management - WAC 317-21-260. Requires operators to implement management
practices that demonstrate active monitoring of vessel operations and maintenance,
personnel training, development, and fitness, and technological improvements in
navigation.
Technology - WAC 317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped with global
positioning system receivers, two separate radar systems, and an emergency towing
system.
Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports - WAC 317-21-540. Requires at least
twenty-four hours notice prior to entry of a tanker into state waters, and requires that
the notice report any conditions that pose a hazard to the vessel or the marine
environment.
36. See Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1489.
41. See id. at 1490.
42. See id. at 1500.
43. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9 h Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 33
(1999).
Intertanko v. Locke
B. The Significance of OPA 90's Savings Clause
The Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the federal preemption issue in
its opinion. The savings clause, in section 1018 of OPA 90,44 played a key
role in the court's decision to uphold Washington's regulations. The court
used the savings clause in two important ways: (1) to find that OPA 90
expressly permits additional state legislation; and (2) as indicative of
Congress's overall intent in the field of tanker regulation to permit supple-
mental state regulation. The court, relying on a plain reading of the savings
clause, found that OPA 90 did not preempt Washington's BAP regulations.45
The court determined, however, that although OPA 90 amended the PWSA
and PTSA, the savings clause did not apply to those earlier Acts, as argued
by the State.46 The court thus found that it was necessary to undertake an
analysis of other federal legislation in the field to determine if Washington's
regulations were otherwise preempted.47
C. The Court's Characterization of Washington's Regulations
Forestalled a Finding of Implicit Federal Preemption
Intertanko contended that federal and international law must reign over
state tanker regulation in the name of maritime safety, and fostering
worldwide commerce on the seas. Intertanko argued that allowing an
additional layer of regulation would result in "a lack of uniformity [impair-
ing] federal superintendence of federal tanker manning, operational and
safety standards, and present a threat to international maritime safety.' 48 In
support of its argument, Intertanko pointed to the Admiralty Clause4 9 of the
United States Constitution as expressly and exclusively conferring admiralty
44. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1018, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(1)(A) (West Supp.
1999).
The savings clause states:
Nothing in this chapter or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall -
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State
of political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or
requirements with respect to -
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such state; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge....
45. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1060.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Intertanko v. Locke, Complaint No. C95-1096 (filed July 17, 1995).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
20001
126 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:117
jurisdiction on federal courts to provide a uniform application of the law
important to the development of worldwide maritime trade."
1. Preemption under the Supremacy Clause
Intertanko claimed that the Washington regulations were invalid under
the Supremacy Clause5 because they "[stood] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."52 Intertanko set forth various categorical regulations found in the
individual federal Acts regulating tankers as indicia of Congress's intent to
preempt state regulation in the field. 3 Although the court chose to look
comprehensively at the federal regulation in the field, it did not find
preemption. The court stated that congressional intent was the most impor-
tant factor in determining implicit federal preemption, despite apparently
comprehensive legislation in a given field. 4 The court found that the
savings clause in OPA 90, Congress's most recent legislation in the tanker
field, indicated overarching congressional intent to leave states free to enact
their own regulations in the field of oil tanker regulation.55
States would well serve their interests by promoting savings clauses in
future federal legislation,56 because such a clause will clearly demonstrate to
a court the congressional intent to permit concurrent state legislation.
Savings clauses will only benefit future environmental legislation because
states can only use such a clause to enact environmental standards more
strict than the minimum standards established by federal legislation.
The court also rejected Intertanko's argument that the federal regulation
of oil tankers under the several existing federal acts so comprehensively
regulated the field as to implicitly preempt supplemental state regulation.
The Ninth Circuit found that the holding in Ray established federal
preemption only where state regulations affected the design and construction
of tankers. Thus, Washington's regulations affecting tanker operation and
50. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,206 (1917) ("The fashioning
of maritime law was not left to the states because of the need for uniformity.").
5 1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
52. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
33 (1999).
53. See id. at 1061-1062.
54. See M. Casey Jarman & Richard McLaughlin, Commentary on Professor Tarlock's
Paper: The Jifluence oflnternationalEnvironmental Law on United States Pollution Control
Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 793, 797 (1997).
55. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1060.
56. See Jarman & McLaughlin, supra note 54, at 797.
Intertanko v. Locke
procedure were valid.57 Opponents of such a narrow interpretation of Ray
argue that although only regulations regarding design and construction
characteristics were before the court in Ray, the scope of the holding should
extend to the regulations under review in Intertanko.5  Section 3703(a) of
the PWSA states that the Secretary shall prescribe regulations for the design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel
qualification, and manning ofvessels.59 It was argued by opponents that "the
matters covered by Washington's current BAP regulations are separated only
by a few statutory commas from the same federal design and construction
regulations found preemptive in Ray.
60
Accepting a broad reading of Ray, it may seem that the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion, upholding Washington's BAP regulations, is in conflict with the
PWSA. The conflict can be reconciled, however, by the court's character-
ization of the nature of the field being regulated. The court viewed
Washington's rules as "environmental regulation" legitimately regulating
water pollution, and as "navigational regulation" necessitated by the
particular characteristics of the local geography and ecosystem.6' The court
found that state regulations in both categories were legitimate exercises of
the State's police power, as opposed to design and construction regulation
which would have been preempted under the Court's holding in Ray. The
court in Chevron also relied on this characterization of the issue. The
Chevron court stated: "there are significant differences between the subject
matter regulated in Ray - vessel design features - and that regulated here
- ocean pollutant discharges."'62
57. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1066.
58. See Charles L. Coleman, Federal Preemption ofState "BAP"Laws: RepellingState
Borders in the Interest of Uniformity, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 305, 329 (1997).
59. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 3703(a) (West Supp. 1999).
60. Coleman, supra note 58, at 329.
61. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978). See also Jarman &
McLaughlin, supra note 54, at 793.
62. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,488 (9t Cir. 1984). The court also
stated" [I]n fact, the local community is more likely competent than the federal government
to tailor environmental regulation to the ecological sensitivities of a particular area." Id. at
493. See also Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,328-29 (1973)
(overruling a district court decision that a Florida statute imposing strict liability for damage
resulting from oil spills was an unconstitutional intrusion into the federal maritime domain).
The court stated:
To rule as the district has done is to allow federal admiralty jurisdiction to swallow
most of the police power of the states over oil spillage - an insidious form of pollution
of vast concern to every coastal city or port and to all the estuaries on which the life of
the ocean and the lives of coastal people are greatly dependent.
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2. Preemption under the Commerce Clause
Intertanko also argued that the Washington regulations imposed new
standards on tankers that already meet existing federal and international
standards, and, therefore, place an undue burden on interstate and interna-
tional commerce.63 The Supreme Court has identified two instances where
state regulations will be held violative of the Commerce Clause:' (1) an
otherwise valid regulation that furthers a legitimate state interest while
incidentally burdening interstate commerce will be invalidated if the burden
is clearly excessive in relation to local benefits; and (2) a regulation that
clearly interferes with interstate commerce is unconstitutional unless the
state makes a showing that a legitimate state interest other than economic
protection necessitates the regulation. 65 Again the characterization of the
issue by the court was paramount in deciding that the ends sought by
Washington's regulations were a local benefit that outweighed an incidental
burden on interstate commerce. By dismissing Intertanko's argument that
the regulations placed too great a burden on commerce, the court expressly
recognized the desire and authority of states to establish regulations
protecting important natural resources in their territorial waters.66
D. International Law Regulating Oil Tankers Merely Establishes
Minimum Standards Which the State Can Exceed in its Interest
of Protecting Territorial Marine Resources from Oil Pollution
Intertanko made the claim that the state regulations interfered with the
purposes and objectives of Congress because they conflicted with various
international treaties. When addressing this issue in Chevron, the court noted
the importance of adhering to a uniform regime of international maritime
regulation.67 The Chevron court, however, did not find reason why
international regulation should exclusively govern a field when nonconflict-
ory local regulation provided significant local benefits without disrupting
international uniformity.
68
63. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1068 (96 Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 33 (1999).
64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1068.
66. See id. at 1069.
67. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 492.
68. See id. at 493:
The PWSA/PTSA does not mandate strict international uniformity. Although the
legislative history of the PWSA/PTSA refers to congressional intent to abide by
Intertanko v. Locke
In rejecting the same argument, the Intertanko court made an analogy to
domestic federal regulation, where both the PWSA and PWTA give the
Coast Guard authority to establish standards stricter than those found in
international regulations." The notion that international standards merely
establish minimum requirements is also supported by the very international
agreements cited by Intertanko as being interfered with by Washington's
regulations. The relationship between international standards and federal
domestic standards is analogous to the relationship between federal domestic
standards and state standards. International agreements, whose primary goal
is worldwide uniformity, often permit entity states to implement their own
rules and regulations regarding environmental protection and marine
pollution in general.7" Also, the authority of signatories to international
agreements regulating shipping does not extend to conferring unilateral
authority to impose irregular design or construction requirements.71 Based
on prior court decisions and the nature of the standards set forth in interna-
tional agreements, the court has established that like federal law, interna-
tional treaties establish only minimum standards that may be surpassed by
the states.72
international agreements regarding the regulation of tankers.... the statute nonetheless
gives the Coast Guard specific authority to establish stricter requirements than those
set by international agreements. This indicates Congress' view that the international
agreements set only minimum standards, that strict international uniformity was
unnecessary, and that standards stricter than the international minimums could be
desirable in waters subject to federal jurisdiction.
69. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1063.
70. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,21 I.L.M. 1261, 1274.
Article 21 "Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage" states:
The coastal state may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of
this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage
through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following:
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal state and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution thereof....
Id. at 1261.
71. See id. Article 21 "Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent
passage" states: "2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted
international rules or standards." Id.
72. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1063 (quoting the court's opinion in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9" Cir. 1984)) ("[P]assage of OPA 90 by Congress
only reinforces this Court's conclusion in Chevron that 'strict international uniformity' with
respect to the regulation of tankers is not 'mandated' by federal law an that 'international
agreements set only minimum standards."'). Id. at 493-494.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite disagreements by various parties on what constitutes an
appropriate scheme of tanker regulation, the Ninth Circuit has established
powerful precedent for allowing states to establish environmental regulation
exceeding the stringency of federal and international regulation in the field.
The court has implied that a strict quest for uniformity fails to address the
need for regulation arising from the unique geographical characteristics and
operational necessities of local waters, and does not sufficiently recognize
state interests in protecting their marine resources. The court has also taken
care to craft its decision in a manner that acknowledges the need for
uniformity in regulations for safe operation, given the tanker industry's
complexity and the nature of international navigation. The court has
established limitations to ensure that state regulation will not conflict with
international or federal regulation. Federal and international regulation will
continue to provide uniform safety and operational rules that are simply
complemented by more stringent state regulations where the need arises
from the unique geographical, ecological, and use characteristics of local
waters.
